Towards Effective Paraphrasing for Information Disguise

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Motivation and Problem Statement

Researchers dealing with public user-generated content often need to paraphrase content related to sensitive topics like health, violence, drug use, etc, before making it public.

- Existing AI-based automated word spinners (e.g., SpinRewriter, WordAI) are often ineffective as their paraphrased content is still locatable on search engines.
- Introducing: an unsupervised black-box adversarial framework to paraphrase content such that querying snippets of text from it on search engines does not lead back to the original content on the web.

Given a sentence 's,' we paraphrase the sentence with the aim:


- Non-locatability: the sentence's source is not in the top-K results when the sentence is queried on search engines
- Fidelity: the semantic meaning of the sentence is preserved


Which part of the sentence to attack first?


STEP 1: Create a constituency-based parse tree for the sentence.

STEP 2: Prioritise parse tree nodes to attack based on PLL scores.

STEP 3: Rank candidates based on *PLL score difference* after replacing masks with BERT suggestions. **PLL:** Probability of a sentence from BERT, by iteratively masking every word in the sentence and then summing the log probabilities.







Types of Attack

Attacking by generating replacements using a combination of:

- 1) **BERT masked language model**: maintains grammar; independent of the phrase being replaced
- 2) Synonyms in Counter-fitting vector space: depends on phrase being replaced; decreases grammar quaility

Multi-level attack for multi-level perturbations

Expanding single-phrase attack to multiple levels using Beam Search.

$$f(s_{paraphrased}) = (1 - \alpha) * \underbrace{Sim(s_{org}, s_{paraphrased})}_{semantic \ similarity} + \alpha * \underbrace{\frac{(Rank(s_{paraphrased}, D_{source}) - 1)}{20}}_{non-locatablity \ of \ source}$$
 (estimated distance to target)

Results

We succeed in disguising 82% of the queries when there are 3 beam levels and 5 nodes per parse tree are expanded.

References

- Reagle, J. and Gaur, M. 2022. Spinning words as disguise: Shady services for ethical research?. First Monday, vol. 27, no. 1, Jan. 2022
- Jin Yong Yoo and Yanjun Qi. 2021. Towards Improving Adversarial Training of NLP Models. EMNLP 2021







